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An infection control programme was implemented 
in a 21,000-bed multihospital institution for con-
trolling the spread of carbapenemase-producing 
Enterobacteriaceae (CPE) and glycopeptide-resist-
ant Enterococcus faecium (GRE), classified as ‘emergent 
extensively drug-resistant bacteria’ (eXDR) in France. 
We evaluated factors associated with outbreaks occur-
rence (n  =  103), which followed 901 eXDR introduc-
tions (index case followed or not by secondary cases) 
from 2010 to 2015. In univariate analysis, knowing that 
patients had been hospitalised abroad, bacterial spe-
cies (GRE vs CPE, as well as the CPE  Klebsiella pneu-
moniae  compared with the other Enterobacteriaceae 
species) and type of measures implemented within 
the first 2  days of hospitalisation were associated 
with outbreaks occurrence, but not the type of wards 
where carriers were hospitalised, nor the eXDR colo-
nisation or infection status. In multivariate analysis, 
occurrence of outbreaks was significantly lower when 
contact precautions (odds ratio (OR):  0.34; 95% con-
fidence interval (CI):  0.22–0.54) and even more when 
dedicated nursing staff (OR: 0.09; 95% CI: 0.02–0.39) 
were implemented around eXDR index cases within the 
first 2 days of hospitalisation (p < 10 − 3). GRE introduc-
tions were more frequently associated with occurrence 
of outbreaks than CPE (OR: 3.58; 95%  CI: 2.32–5.51, 
p < 10 − 3). A sustained and coordinated strategy is effi-
cient to limit the spread of eXDR at the scale of a large 
health institution
Introduction 
Increase in bacterial resistance is nowadays one of the 
most important public health issues. Carbapenemase-
producing Enterobacteriaceae (CPE) are of particu-
lar concerns, since carbapenems represent last line 
beta-lactam antibiotics for treating patients infected 
by multidrug-resistant enterobacteria such as those 
producing extended-spectrum β-lactamases (ESBL) 
[1,2]. Outbreaks of glycopeptide-resistant Enterococcus 
faecium (GRE) in hospitals are also of concern in many 
countries [3]. The documented transfer of vancomy-
cin resistance to meticillin-resistant  Staphylococcus 
aureus  (MRSA) strains raises an additional reason for 
controlling the spread of GRE [4], especially in coun-
tries, such as France, where MRSA rates are still high 
[5]. Acquired resistance to carbapenems due to car-
bapenemases in enterobacteria, as well as resistance 
to vancomycin in  E. faecium, are, so far, uncommon 
in France as shown by the European Antimicrobial 
Resistance Surveillance Network [5]. These multidrug-
resistant pathogens share two critical features con-
cerning their dissemination potential: (i) they are hosts 
of the digestive tract and consequently, are dissemi-
nated by faecal route [6], and (ii) their resistant traits 
are harboured on mobile element, increasing the risk 
of bacteria to bacteria dissemination. Based on the 
risk of their dissemination in the general population, 
these commensal species have been classified as 
‘emergent extensively drug-resistant bacteria’ (eXDR) 
[7] by the French Committee for Public Health, which 
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has published recommendations for preventing their 
spread in 2013 [8].
Assistance Publique – Hôpitaux de Paris (AP-HP), the 
largest public healthcare institution in France, has 
implemented since 2004 a long-term programme for 
surveillance and control of these eXDR [9-11]. A previ-
ous study performed from 2004 to 2012 in this insti-
tution showed that the type of measures implemented 
within the first 2 days, i.e. (i) cohorting eXDR patients 
and nursing staff dedicated to them, or (ii) contact 
precautions without cohorting, or (iii) delayed control 
measures (i.e. use of standard precautions only), sig-
nificantly influenced the number of secondary cases 
around a CPE index patient [11]. The objective of the 
present study was to evaluate at the scale of our whole 
institution the factors associated with the occurrence 
of outbreaks around CPE and GRE index cases from 
January 2010 to December 2015.
Methods
Setting
AP-HP is a public health institution administering 38 
teaching hospitals (22 acute care and 16 rehabilitation/
long-term care (RLTC) hospitals, spread over Paris, sub-
urbs and surrounding counties), with a total of 21,000 
beds (10% of all public hospital beds in France) and 
serving 12  million inhabitants. AP-HP admits 1  million 
inpatients per year, employs 22,000 physicians, 20,000 
nurses and 30,000 assistant nurses. Administrators 
and medical committees manage AP-HP hospitals 
locally, but decisions on large investments and general 
medical policy are taken by the central administration. 
A local infection control team (LICT) is in charge of 
prevention and surveillance of healthcare-associated 
infections in each hospital but decisions of foremost 
importance for the whole institution are coordinated by 
a multidisciplinary central infection control team (CICT: 
infectious disease physician, bacteriologist, epidemi-
ologist and nurse) [9,10,12]. The institutional multid-
rug-resistant control programme has included, for more 
than 20  years, different actions such as promotion of 
contact precautions for MRSA [12] and ESBL-producing 
Enterobacteriaceae, promotion of alcohol-based hand-
rub solutions for hand hygiene, campaigns to decrease 
antibiotics consumption [10] and implementation of an 
excreta management policy [13].
Case definitions
According to national recommendations, eXDR include 
CPE and GRE [8]. A case was defined as any patient 
infected or colonised (i.e. positive culture of rectal 
swab) with an eXDR. An introduction was defined as 
one index case (the first case identified), followed or 
not by secondary case(s). A contact patient was defined 
as any patient whose stay overlapped with the stay of 
an eXDR case for at least one day in the same unit, or 
who was cared for by the same personnel as the index 
case. An outbreak was defined as at least two eXDR 
cases (i.e. one index case and at least one secondary 
case among the contact patients) occurring in a given 
hospital, with a clear epidemiological link (stay dur-
ing the same period of time in the same unit, or cared 
for by the same personnel in two different units) and 
involving indistinguishable eXDR strain based on spe-
cies, antibiotic susceptibility pattern and mechanism 
of resistance (carbapenemase or van genes).
Microbiological methods
Microbiological methods to screen patients for GRE 
and CPE carriage followed French guidelines [14], 
and were detailed previously [9,11]. Most laborato-
ries used conventional cultures with a turnaround 
time of 48 hours; some of them added PCR meth-
ods. Genotypic methods were used to identify which 
gene was involved,  vanA  or  vanB  for GRE,  OXA-48-
like, NDM, KPC or VIM for CPE. In case of doubt, strains 
were sent for further characterisation to the French 
National Reference Center for Antibiotic Resistance 
(Kremlin Bicêtre hospital for CPE, Caen hospital for 
GRE).
eXDR control programme
The AP-HP eXDR control programme was previously 
described in detail [9,11]. In short, the most important 
measures were:
(i) pre-emptive isolation (contact precautions) and 
screening for eXDR, of every patient with a history of 
hospital stay in a foreign country in the past year;
Figure 1
Number of GRE and CPE introductions, and proportion 
of outbreaks among these eXDR introductions, Assistance 
Publique–Hôpitaux de Paris, France, 2010–2015 (n = 901 
introductions)
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(ii) implementing contact precautions for an eXDR 
carrier; in addition, it was recommended to dedicate, 
to the extent possible, nursing staff (one nurse and 
one caregiver) for the eXDR carrier’s care; if nursing 
staff could not be dedicated to a single patient, care 
was organised in the unit by beginning with contact 
patient’s care and finishing with eXDR patient’s care;
(iii) screening contact patients by culturing rectal 
swabs and pursuing screening of contact patients once 
weekly;
(iv) if at least one secondary case was identified, 
cohorting patients in three distinct areas with dedi-
cated nursing staff: the ‘eXDR patients’ section, the 
‘contact patients’ section and the ‘eXDR-free patients’ 
section for newly admitted patients with no previous 
contact with eXDR cases.
Control measures were implemented on admission 
based on the patient history (i.e. recent hospital stay 
in foreign country) and were respectively continued or 
cancelled when microbiological results confirmed or 
infirmed eXDR carriage. In practice, measures in place 
within the first 2 days following admission of an index 
case ranged from, at best, quick setting of dedicated 
nursing staff and contact precautions for the patient, to 
quick setting of contact precautions without dedicated 
nursing staff, or to standard (basic level) precautions 
only if the two types of other control measures were 
delayed, for example for carriers identified based on 
a clinical specimen taken during hospitalisation. Thus, 
each eXDR introduction was classified by CICT and 
LICTs in the three above categories of measures, the 
first including the two others and the second including 
the third.
Variables explored as possible factors associated 
with occurrence of outbreaks
For each introduction, the following factors were col-
lected: histories of previous hospitalisation or stay 
abroad, type of ward where the index case was admit-
ted (intensive care, surgery, medicine, or RLTC units), 
categories of measures implemented within the first 
2  days of hospitalisation around an index case (dedi-
cated nursing staff, contact precautions or standard 
precautions), colonisation or infection at the moment 
of identification of eXDR, species of bacteria (CPE or 
GRE), and gene resistance involved.
Statistical analysis
The data were analysed with Stata (version 13, College 
Station, TX, US). Results are expressed as mean ± stand-
ard deviation or median with interquartile range (IQR) 
for continuous variables or as percentages of the group 
from which they were derived (categorical variables). A 
chi-squared test and a Fischer exact test were used to 
compare categorical variables. Odds ratios (ORs) and 
Figure 2
(a) Proportion of outbreaks among eXDRa introductions and (b) proportion of secondary cases among eXDR cases, 
according to measures implemented within the first two days around an eXDR index case, in the 38 hospitals of Assistance 
Publique–Hôpitaux de Paris, France, 2010–2015
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95% confidence intervals (CIs) were calculated for all 
associations that emerged. Two-tailed tests were used 
to determine statistical significance; a p value of < 0.05 
was considered significant. Multivariate analysis was 
used to identify independent risk factors for outbreaks’ 
occurrence. For this analysis, we used logistic regres-
sion, and variables found to be significant in univariate 
testing were incorporated with a stepwise approach. 
Analyses to identify independent risk factors for occur-
rence of outbreaks were performed for eXDR introduc-
tions and for GRE and CPE introductions separately. 
A regression analysis was conducted to assess the 
increase of number of introductions over the 6-year 
period of the study (Student test). A chi-squared test 
for linear trend was performed to evaluate the evolu-
tion of proportion of outbreaks among introductions 
(Cochran–Armitage test).
Results 
From January 2010 to December 2015, 901 eXDR 
introductions, including 655 CPE and 246 GRE, were 
reported in AP-HP hospitals.
The main species involved in CPE introductions 
were Klebsiella pneumoniae (n = 292, 45%), Escherichia 
coli  (n  =  273, 42%) and other species (n  =  90, 14%). 
The carbapenemases identified were OXA-48-like 
(n = 513), NDM (n = 96), KPC (n = 39) and VIM (n = 19). 
In 12 CPE introductions, two distinct carbapenemases 
were identified, OXA-48-like and NDM. Among GRE 
introductions, the genes encoding vancomycin resist-
ance were vanA (n = 213) and vanB (n = 33).
Among the 901 introductions, 669 (74%) involved 
patients with a known history of hospitalisation abroad 
(n = 518) or stay abroad (n = 151) within the past year. 
The number of introductions per year increased signifi-
cantly over the 6-year period of the study, from 34 in 
2010 to 297 in 2015 (p < 0.01). Overall, 103 of the 901 
introductions (11%) led to an outbreak. The proportion 
of outbreaks decreased over time, from 29% (10/34) to 
9% (28/397), p < 0.05 (Figure 1). 
The median number of outbreaks per hospital was 2, 
IQR (1–5).
Overall, the 901 eXDR introductions resulted in 1,328 
cases. Among these cases, 798 were single cases (i.e. 
index cases not followed by secondary case) and 530 
were clustered in the 103 outbreaks recorded (103 index 
cases and 427 secondary cases). The number of sec-
ondary cases ranged globally from 1 to 46 per outbreak 
(median 2; IQR: 1–4; mean: 4 ± 6). The median number 
of secondary cases was 1, IQR (1–4) for CPE outbreaks, 
and 2, IQR (1–6) for GRE outbreaks respectively.
The characteristics of eXDR introductions and the pro-
portions of outbreaks among these introductions are 
Table 1
Univariate analysis of variables potentially affecting the proportion of outbreaks among eXDR introductions (CPE or GRE) 
in the 38 hospitals of Assistance Publique–Hôpitaux de Paris, France, 2010–2015
Variables
Number of eXDR 
introductions 
 
n = 901
Number of 
outbreaks n = 103
Proportion of outbreaks 
among introductions OR (95% CI) P value
Type of ward
Surgery 210 17 8% 1
0.19
Intensive care unit 222 25 11% 1.44 (0.75–2.76)
Medicine 398 49 12% 1.59 (0.89–2.85)
RLTC 71 12 17% 2.31 (1.04–5.15)
Known previous hospitalisation or stay abroad in the past year
Known previous hospitalisation or 
stay abroad in the past yeara 669 55 8% 0.34 (0.22–0.53) < 0.001
Colonisation or infection
eXDR colonisation 732 81 11% 1
0.34
eXDR infection 169 22 13% 1.27 (0.77–2.09)
Bacterial species
CPE 655 51 8% 1
< 0.001
GRE 246 52 21% 3.17 (2.07–4.86)
Measures implemented around the index case within the first 2 days of hospitalisation
Standard precautions 367 67 18% 1
< 0.001Contact precautions 460 34 7% 0.36 (0.23–0.56)
Dedicated nursing staff 74 2 3% 0.12 (0.03–0.53)
CI: confidence interval; CPE: carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae; eXDR: emergent extensively drug-resistant bacteria; GRE: 
glycopeptide-resistant Enterococcus faecium; OR: odds ratio; RLTC: rehabilitation/long-term care.
a The reference is no known hospitalisation abroad in the past year.
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presented in  Table 1. Univariate analysis showed (i) 
that knowing that a patient had been recently hospital-
ised or had stayed abroad, and (ii) that dedicated nurs-
ing staff and contact precautions around index case 
within 2 days of hospitalisation were associated with a 
lower proportion of outbreaks occurrence. Moreover it 
also showed (iii) that GRE introductions were more fre-
quently associated with an outbreak occurrence than 
CPE introductions.
Logistic regression analysis showed that measures 
implemented around the index case were associated 
with occurrence of outbreaks, as well as bacterial 
species (Table 2). Indeed, the less stringent the pre-
cautions implemented within the first 2 days of hospi-
talisation, the higher the rate of outbreaks. GRE was 
also identified as an independent factor associated 
with outbreaks’ occurrence. Since outbreaks appeared 
to be more frequent in RLTC wards, the variable RLTC 
(i.e. hospitalisation in RLTC: yes or no) was also con-
sidered in multivariate analysis. Being hospitalised 
in RLTC was not associated with outbreak occurrence 
(OR: 1.32; 95% CI: 0.66–2.66, p = 0.44).
Figure 2 illustrates the proportion of outbreaks among 
eXDR introductions and the number of secondary cases 
per introduction, according to measures implemented 
within the first two days. 
Univariate (data not shown) and multivariate analysis 
(Table 3) were also performed separately for CPE and 
GRE. For both CPE and GRE (Table 3), contact precau-
tions or dedicated nursing staff implemented around 
the index case were independently associated with 
the occurrence of outbreaks. Furthermore, for CPE, the 
species  K.  pneumoniae  was independently associated 
with a higher rate of occurrence of outbreaks.
Discussion 
This prospectively designed infection-control interven-
tion analysis reports the largest institutional experi-
ence (more than 900 introductions, i.e. index cases, 
over a period of 6 years) of an eXDR control programme 
in a country where CPE and GRE are still at an emerg-
ing stage (sporadic hospital outbreaks [15]). Bundle 
measures comparable with those described in the pre-
sent study (carrier isolation, patient and staff cohort-
ing, active contact tracing and screening) succeeded in 
containing a large nationwide CPE outbreak in Israel as 
reported by Schwaber [16,17]. GRE and CPE are commen-
sal bacteria of the digestive tract, prompt to be dissem-
inated by faecal contamination and hand transmission 
[6]. Identification of efficient measures to control the 
spread of these organisms in hospitals is of foremost 
importance to limit healthcare-associated infections 
for which there are few treatment possibilities [18]. The 
bundled eXDR programme, implemented since 2004 in 
our institution, has proven efficient to control GRE out-
breaks [9] and CPE spread [11]. The present study con-
firms that the eXDR programme is efficient to limit the 
spread of GRE and CPE in our large public health insti-
tution during a prolonged period. The number of eXDR 
index cases dramatically increased in the last years, 
mostly in relation with previous hospitalisation or stay 
in foreign countries, and was not the result of changes 
in number of beds, admissions, rate of occupancy or 
changes in the organisation of the institution. Despite 
this increase in index cases, the number of outbreaks 
decreased and remained contained.
Furthermore, this study allows evaluating factors asso-
ciated with outbreaks occurrence. Interestingly, no link 
was found with the type of wards where the carriers 
were hospitalised. Indeed, outbreaks did not occur 
more frequently in intensive care units than in medicine 
or surgery wards, probably because the type of meas-
ures implemented is more important than the place 
where they are implemented. Although the difference 
was not statistically significant, outbreaks seemed to 
be a little more frequent in RLTC wards, maybe because 
eXDR carriers stayed there for a longer period than in 
acute care wards, and because implementing meas-
ures could be more difficult in RLTC wards due to lim-
ited human resources.
No difference in the occurrence of outbreaks was found 
according to the eXDR status, i.e. colonised or infected, 
of the patient. It is known that patients infected with 
these digestive commensal bacteria, are generally also 
colonised and are therefore source of dissemination by 
faecal route [19].
Interestingly, known hospitalisation or stay abroad 
was associated with a lower occurrence of outbreaks in 
univariate analysis. Obviously, these factors are known 
to favour eXDR carriage but, conversely, knowing that 
Table 2
Multivariate analysis of factors associated with occurrence of outbreaks among eXDR introductions (CPE or GRE), in the 38 
hospitals of Assistance Publique–Hôpitaux de Paris, France, 2010–2015
Measures implemented around the index case within the first 2 days of hospitalisation OR (95% CI) P value
Standard precautions 1
< 0.001Contact precautions 0.34 (0.22–0.54)
Dedicated nursing staff 0.09 (0.02–0.39)
Bacterial species: GRE 3.58 (2.32–5.51) < 0.001
CI: confidence interval; CPE: carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae; GRE: glycopeptide-resistant Enterococcus faecium; OR: odds 
ratio.
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a patient is at risk to be an eXDR carrier allows prompt 
implementation of control measures at admission, 
therefore decreasing the risk of cross transmission. In 
multivariate analysis, the latter factors were not asso-
ciated with occurrence of outbreaks because they were 
strongly linked with the type of measures implemented.
The present study allowed to clearly assess the impact 
on the occurrence of outbreaks of the different types 
of measures (standard precautions, contact precau-
tions or dedicated nursing staff) implemented during 
the first 2  days of hospitalisation. Indeed, the rate of 
outbreaks was lower when nursing staff was dedicated 
to the index case than when only contact or standard 
precautions were implemented, as shown by logistic 
regression analysis. Not only did the occurrence of 
outbreaks differ according to measures implemented 
around an index case, but also the size of the out-
breaks, the number of secondary cases being higher 
when only contact or standard precautions were used. 
Importantly, quickly applying contact precautions 
around index patients was not sufficient to avoid sec-
ondary cases which occurred in 34 of 460 introductions 
(18/342 CPE, 5% and 16/118 GRE, 14%). This lack of 
guarantee has been already reported by others [20,21]. 
Indeed, contact precautions, as well as standard pre-
cautions, are not constantly applied with rigor on all 
days and by all healthcare workers, so they are far from 
sufficient to avoid transmission of resistant bacteria.
In the present study, dedicated nursing staff and 
cohorting clearly appeared to be the most effective 
measure to avoid nosocomial transmission [20,22-25]. 
However, limitation in nursing staff may be an obsta-
cle to dedicate several healthcare workers to a single 
index case. If this cannot be done, regular screening 
of contact patients to rapidly detect secondary cases 
is critical as well as implementing reinforced outbreak 
control measures [26]. An evaluation of costs associ-
ated with implementation of measures for controlling 
spread of eXDR in three hospitals of our institution, 
showed that early identification and implementation 
of contact precautions was the less expensive scenario 
[27]. The cost of prevention of outbreaks has to be 
compared with the cost of controlling an outbreak, par-
ticularly when the number of secondary cases is high. 
Moreover, the cost of preventing spread of eXDR should 
be balanced with the cost of further eXDR infections in 
the community.
Interestingly, in multivariate analysis, GRE appeared 
to spread more easily than CPE. One hypothesis to 
explain this, is that GRE survives for a prolonged period 
of time on environmental surfaces and can therefore 
contaminate more easily healthcare workers’ hands 
[28]. This hypothesis would encourage to consider a 
specific protocol for daily and terminal room cleaning 
after discharge of GRE carriers. It should additionally 
be emphasised that among CPE introductions, the spe-
cies K. pneumoniae was also independently associated 
with occurrence of outbreaks.
Our study has potential limitations. First, it was not a 
randomised, controlled trial aiming at assessing direct 
causality between measures implemented and out-
come. The rapid spread of eXDR in neighbouring coun-
tries [5] triggered quick and strong actions to control 
this emerging problem in France, contraindicating ran-
domised comparative studies. Most studies reporting 
GRE or CPE control programmes assessed the effect 
of introducing a bundle of interventions, which made 
it difficult to determine the effectiveness of individual 
measures [16,20,22,26,29,30]. Our study allows com-
paring the impact of different levels of control measures 
(standard precautions, contact precautions, dedicated 
nursing staff) on the occurrence of outbreaks and the 
size of outbreaks, using a pragmatic approach in real 
life.
Another limitation of the study is that outbreaks were 
defined based on epidemiological and microbiological 
criteria and not on the genotype of the strains involved. 
Since eXDR introductions were rare in our institution 
and most index cases had a history of stay abroad, we 
considered pragmatically that cases, that occurred in 
the same unit than the index case, as well as in the 
Table 3
Multivariate analysis of factors associated with occurrence of outbreaks among CPE and GRE introductions, Assistance 
Publique–Hôpitaux de Paris, France, 2010–2015
Measures implemented around the index case within the first 2 days of hospitalisation OR (95% CI) P value
CPE
Standard precautions 1
< 0.001Contact precautions 0.41 (0.22–0.74)
Dedicated nursing staff 0.17 (0.02–1.29)
Bacterial species: Klebsiella pneumoniae 4.98 (1.16–21.45) < 0.05
GRE
Standard precautions 1
< 0.001Contact precautions 0.26 (0.13–0.51)
Dedicated nursing staff 0.05 (0.01–0.40)
CPE: carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae; GRE: glycopeptide-resistant Enterococcus faecium.
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same period of time and with the same species, same 
gene of resistance and same antibiotic susceptibility 
pattern, were linked to the index case, without other 
molecular considerations.
A further limitation of our study is that we did not 
evaluate hand hygiene compliance, the most important 
measure to prevent and control hospital-associated 
infection, at the level of the unit where eXDR cases 
were admitted. Hand hygiene with alcohol-based hand-
rub solutions was reinforced around eXDR carriers, but 
we were not able to integrate alcohol hand rub solution 
consumption in the statistical analysis, since the con-
sumption is not measured at the ward level but only at 
hospital level in our institution. Management of excreta 
(stools and urines) is another point of major impor-
tance to control spread of faecal bacteria in hospitals. 
Healthcare workers were asked to be especially vigilant 
on hand hygiene during excreta management and were 
encouraged to use disposable excreta collection bags 
for every eXDR carrier requiring the use of a bedpan. 
Unfortunately this point was not taken in account in 
our statistical analysis.
In conclusion, this study shows that CPE and GRE 
spread can be strongly limited by a specific control 
programme, even at the scale of a large multihospital 
institution. The level of measures implemented around 
index case within the 2 days following hospitalisation 
was associated with the occurrence of outbreaks, dedi-
cated staff being more efficient than contact precau-
tions which were in turn more efficient than standard 
precautions. Such a programme requires strong and 
sustained involvement of all stakeholders, particu-
larly the infection control team, medical and nursing 
staff, microbiologists and hospital administrators. Our 
results could help to convince and stimulate all these 
stakeholders.
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